TEKST

What is Die Alternative?



In the wake of multiple economic crises and an influx of refugees into Europe, the cracks forming in the European Union were becoming hard to ignore. So, when Donald Trump’s surprise victory telegraphed a rejection of liberal internationalism and a renewed fixation on anti-immigration rhetoric, it could be understood as an omen for what other established liberal democracies were beginning to experience. The Alternative für Deutschland in particular shows how disillusionment with post-nationalist Liberalism and its political class, became intertwined with questions of migration and border security.


The Rape of Europa (c. 1560-62), Tizian, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons


On November 6th, less than 24 hours after Donald Trump was once again declared president elect, the German governing coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals collapsed. With new elections on the horizon and the German left as weak as it has ever been, a rightward shift seems likely. Whatever desperate coalitions had formed in opposition to the West’s flirtation with “right-wing populism” may have temporarily halted its momentum, but the Trump era is far from over. By now it should be clear that it takes more than the likes of Joe Biden, Keir Starmer or Olaf Scholz to change the course set for the West over the last decade. Instead, this brief interlude of sensible social-liberal politics has only fueled the discontent with the political establishment. CoVid-19 and the climate crisis might have made some voters nostalgic for a time of boring, uninspired but reliable administration. Instead, they found out that the “competent administrators” were no more capable of resolving the by now permanent state of crisis than their blundering opponents.

In the wake of multiple economic crises and an influx of refugees into Europe, the cracks forming in the European Union were becoming hard to ignore. So, when Donald Trump’s surprise victory telegraphed a rejection of liberal internationalism and a renewed fixation on anti-immigration rhetoric, it could be understood as an omen for what other established liberal democracies were beginning to experience. The Alternative für Deutschland in particular shows how disillusionment with post-nationalist Liberalism and its political class became intertwined with questions of migration and border security. Founded by an economics professor looking to return Germany from the Euro back to a national currency, the party quickly became a rallying point for anyone disillusioned with the idea of European unity. As German frustration with Merkel and the EU became less about lazy Greeks and more about Syrian refugees, the AfD changed course and leadership just in time for the trend that would define the late 2010s: right-wing populism.

Populism is not an american invention, but neither is the word “Hamburger” and Donald Trump is never far from our minds when we hear either term. Many of the European “right-wing populists” predate Trump – or at least the point he was taken seriously as a candidate – but his victory clearly became an aesthetic point of inspiration for anyone mobilizing around political discontent. Suddenly every country had their very own middle-aged slob with a horrible haircut and an ill-fitting suit, trying to get epic dunks on journalists. From Georgia (USA) all the way to Georgia, seemed like everybody was doing the Trump. Or at least they tried, because while they sure dressed like him, walked, talked and acted like him, they just were not quite him. No EU-cryptkeeper, central-european autocrat or South African Tech-Billionaire could pull off the full Trump any more than they could pull off a cowboy hat and boots. Donald Trump, the man, was a genuine anomaly in American politics, because his TV businessman persona was a familiar archetype to voters looking to vote for anyone but another politician. His 2016 victory started a new wave, because – as is typical for Americans – he had created the biggest splash. During this anti-establishment goldrush, a slight tweak from boardroom brawler to boarding school bully might have been enough to briefly elevate a man as ridiculous as Boris Johnson, but it could not revive the Conservative party. Long term success in the era of democratic discontent belongs to political outsiders with an image similarly suited to the specific national context they exist in.

The AfD is scary, because many people – a lot of them Germans – had come to believe that Germany’s past now made it uniquely resistant to fascist mobilization. In fact, before Americans learned about AfD, being German carried real social capital at a time when half-remembered, smugly delivered nazi comparisons made up 90% of all political discourse. But while Germany has so far managed to keep the far-right out of power through a mix of political marginalization and public pressure, here we are, nonetheless. All the constitutional barriers put in place to stop history from repeating itself, have instead shaped a form of reactionary politics best suited to avoid the anti-nazi tripwires. Nominally in favour of “real” democracy, but just fascist enough to hold the attention of the organized far-right, AfD combines the rhetoric of reunification era GDR democratization movements with a dash of Hitler. It lives in the grey areas, moves in the dead angles, perfectly adapted to its habitat. If Germany succeeds in keeping them out of power indefinitely or adapts its constitutional protections to outlaw the party entirely, then only at the further cost of democratic legitimacy; a Weimar-style dilemma Germany’s militant democracy was supposed to solve.

But was there ever any hope that outlawing a specific kind of party could meaningfully defeat fascism? Among political scientists, the AfD is often considered an unusual case among right-wing populist parties for its lack of a unifying charismatic leader. It does not take a political scientist, however, to realize why such a figure has not materialized in Germany. Meanwhile, all attempts to separate the MAGA movement from the person of Donald Trump have failed. Yet at no point in the last decade would calling the AfD Germany’s Trump have raised too many eyebrows. Their commonality rests on what they represent within their respective political landscapes: a threat to the way politics is conducted, coming from the right. If the 20th century ended in the near universal triumph of liberal democracy as the way of structuring a free society, then the 21st has started with an analogous backlash.

The emergent right-wing is defined not by its leadership structure or a coherent vision of society, but by the discontent it mobilizes around. Whether they were economically neoliberal or some novel combination of nationalist and socialist, whether they were openly authoritarian or outwardly democratic, part of an established political tradition or new challengers: they were all alike branded right-wing populists, and Trump knows how to own a brand. The ban of a political party or the death of its leader might significantly dampen a movement, but the discontent remains – as do the elite interests behind it all. In this sense, the threat posed by right wing populism is never only tied to one specific political actor.

When Trump first took the White House, he was the glitch in the system, the thing that was not supposed to happen. He took the inert, rusty state apparatus by storm and the world scrambled to reposition itself around his unpredictable whims. The real sense of panic he caused in his opponents cannot be explained by his monstrous policies alone, given their own increasingly obvious monstrousness. Instead, it was horror at established party structures failing in their intended function of selecting appropriately monstrous candidates through the proper channels. Trump’s 2016 victory was a proof of concept for a candidate utilizing their personal influence and widespread discontent to bypass large parts of the party system.

Today resignation has replaced the spirit of resistance, because by now his victory has become just another possibility to anticipate. That might not matter much to undocumented immigrants or trans people in the US, but anyone who actually matters has long realized it is better to surf the waves than to fight the tide. By now all kinds of American elites have managed to make their pet projects compatible with Trump. If his first term disrupted politics as they were supposed to function, his second term promises to benefit self-identified disruptor types in Silicon Valley in entirely predictable ways. Appropriately, conservative revolution functions like cryptocurrency: it will never challenge established power structures as promised, but if you have the money and invested early enough it might still take you to the top.

Not only in the United States have political and economic elites absorbed the initial populist shock. As it turns out, “America first” is not a winning strategy for Europe and between the threat of Russian expansion and a fickle, isolationist US there is a new demand for European Unity. The initial excitement about shaking up old institutions and a return to the pre-globalized era was dampened on the continent as Brexit limped past the finish line, sparing us potentially dozens of clunky variations of the portmanteau. But while there is not much political capital left in acting like a buffoon and selling “Make Liechtenstein Great Again” hats as if that means anything to anyone, that does not mean Europe has halted its rightward shift.

Instead of tearing apart the European Union, right-wing momentum has become focused on transforming it. After all, the last ten years have shown that all the tools for securing Fortress Evropa have long been in place. Does it really take the brutish American approach to realize the eurofascist project? All it takes is for the political establishment to decide that if there is going to be a right-wing revolution, they would rather be on the side of those doing it. In Germany, the Centre has held so far, and all parties in the Bundestag continue to refuse all cooperation with the AfD. However, much like everywhere else, the target of this united front is not so much right-wing populism, as it is right-wing populism. European history casts a dark shadow over any attempts at affective mobilization of the masses, especially in Germany.

Conveniently, forgotten is the fact that even Hitler – unburdened by any previous Hitlers – did not seize power by simply marching his followers on Berlin, but by making compromises with legitimate power. There should be no illusions that the anti-fascist stance taken by CDU/CSU today is anything but political strategy necessitated by public pressure. The AfD may prove too uncomfortably reminiscent of the past to ever become a major player anywhere outside the struggling east, but their presence alone has shifted political discourse significantly to the right. Western Germany instead longs for the return of Mommy in these uncertain times. Maybe not Merkel herself, but perhaps another competent executive type with a little more lifeblood and an unscrupulous border policy.

While Alice Weidel certainly fits the bill for a German Meloni or Le Pen, the AfD will not be able to seize power without some cooperation from the “moderate” right. For now, this is unlikely to happen – if only because Conservatives still have a lot to lose and little to gain. As the social-liberal coalition falls apart, CDU/CSU has to do nothing but to sit there and look pretty. It took 16 years of austerity and corruption for Conservatives to lose an election and after less than one term in the opposition, they are back in the driver’s seat. Not because of any perceived competence, even among its voters, but by default, as Germany is running out of alternatives to the Alternative.

It feels tone deaf to point out the rightward shift of democratic parties while thousands of brave activists risk their well-being and their freedom to stop the AfD national convention in Riesa. At the same time, it bears asking whether similar resistance could be mounted against far-right politics if its proponents were less offensive to German sensibilities. Without the constant effort exerted by civil society against any measure of normalization, it is doubtful that the AfD would still be as marginalized politically as it is. Instead of the ideologically incoherent and politically impotent coalitions between Conservatives, Greens, Liberals, Social-Democrats – and most recently even Strasserites – we might have seen coalitions with the AfD years ago. But the AfD is not in power, so who is responsible when police beat down activists in Riesa? Who oversaw the violence against pro-Palestinian protests? Who is to blame for German foreign policy and economic collapse at home? Resisting the AfD by all means remains our duty, but it bears repeating that the cordon sanitaire is mutually beneficial for both the far right and the less outwardly freakish right-wing. Activist pressure maintains the political marginalization of the AfD, but it cannot be expected to persuade anyone who still supports the party by now. The threat posed to liberal democracy in Germany is a selling point to them; the resistance against the party only affirms its outsider status. Conservatives, on the other hand, get to posture as principled defenders of democracy even as they openly pander to these same exact voters.

In the end, it was the Liberal FDP that brought down Germany’s first and last alternative to right-wing rule in 20 years. This is anything but unusual given the party’s history of flip-flopping, but it is still a cause for concern. While the FDP has not actively cooperated with the far-right since the forceful restructuring of the party at the hand of the Brits in the 1950s (look up Naumann Kreis), it has frequently abandoned governing coalitions when it sensed the wind was turning. In the late 1960s they helped elect Germany’s first SPD chancellor, only to swing back towards economic liberalism in time for the 1980s. Their decision to join a social-liberal coalition four years ago was as much a sign of the times as their intentional sabotage of said coalition to force an election now.

Judging by recent state-level results, the outcome of the federal election in February will almost certainly be a deeply unpopular coalition sure to further erode public trust in the institutions of liberal democracy. But even if Germany succeeds at containing the AfD indefinitely, there is only limited value to even the defense of democracy when said democracy fails to produce anything but millions of deaths on its borders. Perhaps the lesson to learn is that in Germany, even the death of democracy will still be a slow, boring bureaucratic scandal, not a storm on the capitol. After all, what could be more German than institutionally legitimized evil?

Enno Jasper

Tekst je financiran sredstvima Fonda za poticanje pluralizma i raznovrsnosti elektroničkih medija Agencije za elektroničke medije za 2024. godinu.

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